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FEDERAL REMOVAL AND INJUNCTION TO PROTECT
POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND RACIAL EQUALITY: A
PROPOSED CHANGE
Constitutionally secured civil rights and liberties are enforceable
in federal courts and, by virtue of the supremacy clause, demand
recognition in otherwise independent state courts as well. Through this
accommodation, the duality of judicial administration and the
supremacy of federal law coexist within our federal system. The
principle of duality in judicial administration is imperfect, however,
for the tribunal to which all state courts must ultimately look for
authority on federal questions is the United States Supreme Court.
Similarly, the supremacy of federal law, while perfect in principle, is
imperfect in fact; for federal forums are often initially unavailable to
prevent a state from infringing federal rights in the exercise of its
police power. That is, the principle of duality recognizes the state's
legitimate interest in adjudicating questions arising in the exercise of
its police power and does not permit all federal rights to receive
immediate protection in a federal forum, the assumption being that
federal rights receive the same protection in state courts as in federal
courts.
This Comment explores the problem of obtaining at the outset a
federal forum in which to assert and protect federally-secured rights
of free political expression and racial equality against incursion by
state criminal prosecutions. Ultimate federal review may be available
by appeal or certiorari to the Supreme Court, but that review pays
great deference to the state fact finder. Moreover, such review is
ordinarily available, if at all, only after the claimant has exhausted his
state remedies. Initial access to a federal forum to protect federal
rights of political expression or racial equality is available only in
limited circumstances. In general, the remedy of federal anti-suit
injunction to prevent the commencement or continuance of state
criminal proceedings is available only to a claimant who can make a
timely showing in advance and from the face of the state statute
involved that such state adjudication will certainly deny his federal
right of political expression. Similarly, the remedy of federal removal
is normally available only to a claimant who can make a like
showing-also from the face of a state statute-that state
adjudication will deny his right of racial equality. The principal
exception to the general rule arises in those "equal access" cases in
which a Negro seeking equal service in public accommodations has
thereby become a defendant in a state criminal trespass prosecution.
REMOVAL AND INJUNCTION
Here, the barrier to initial federal relief has been lowered, and
claimants in such cases may obtain removal or an anti-suit injunction
on the theory that federal law has transmuted a crime into a right,
and that any state prosecution-regardless of its outcome and
regardless of the facial validity of the state statute-abridges this
federal right.
This Comment suggests that the combination of the advance
certainty test and the equal access exception thereto constitutes a
logical absurdity in the judicial evolution of federal remedies which
new federal legislation can and should correct. The advance certainty
test serves to keep federal courts out of the fact-finding and guilt-
determining processes in deference to the peculiar interests of the
states in administering their own criminal laws. The equal access
exception permits federal courts to engage in fact finding to protect
only one right, while excluding many equally crucial rights from the
benefit of initial federal protection. This exception rests upon a
vacuous distinction between a federal right which carries with it a
concommitant proscription of state prosecution for its exercise and
those federal rights which have no such collateral protective umbrella.
The identification of those cases in which a federal court will engage
in fact finding to guard feddral rights at the outset should not turn
upon the chance occurrence-of a concommitant statutory right barring
state prosecution-such as the right which the Court found in the
equal access cases-but rather upon the nature, importance, and
sensitivity of the substantive right itself. It is further the thesis of this
Comment that the guarantees of free political expression and racial
equality are rights to which federal courts should accord special initial
protection regardless of the facial validity of the statute which
threatens their exercise in state criminal prosecutions.
Part I of this Comment examines the existing means by which
prospective defendants can obtain federal protection for their rights of
free political expression or racial equality when threatened by state
criminal proceedings. It will trace the recent and parallel evolution of
the federal remedies of injunction and removal, examining the
differing restrictions now in force upon both. Part II will analyze
those restrictions in terms of federal theory, offering a critique of the
view of federalism which they imply. Part III will propose a statute
unifying the remedies of injunction and removal, making their
availability depend upon neither the existence of a facially void statute
nor a right carrying a concommitant freedom from prosecution, but
upon the nature, importance and sensitivity of the right itself.
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THE SCOPE OF PRESENT REMEDIES
Initial federal relief from state criminal proceedings may take the
form of an anti-suit injunction or removal to a federal court. Since
the limitations now in force upon these two remedies differ
substantially, it is best to discuss them separately, even though there is
considerable overlap in function. The form in which federal relief
must be cast depends in part upon the status of the state proceedings.
For the purposes of federal relief, the moment at which a state
criminal prosecution commences is the instant an indictment is
returned, or an information or complaint is filed.' Prior to that
moment the proper form for initial federal relief is the anti-suit
injunction, which may then block the commencement of state
proceedings. After that moment an anti-suit injunction may still be
available to block the continuance of proceedings. Removal is
available only after state proceedings have commenced.2
A. Federal Anti-Suit Injunctions
1. Injunctions Preventing the Commencement of State Prosecution
The judicial doctrine of abstention,3 which holds that state courts
must have a chance initially to decide federal questions arising in the
course of state adjudication, has historically been the principal limit
I. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
2. Virginia v. Paul, 148 U.S. 107, 119-20 (1893).
3. Justice Frankfurter fathered the abstention doctrine, under which a federal court may
refrain from deciding even substantial federal questions, and gave it its fullest expression in
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman involved a state statute which
the Commission interpreted to require conductors (who were all white), and not porters (who
were all Negroes) to operate sleeper cars. Acknowledging a substantial equal protection issue
raised by the railroad and porters in objecting to the Commission's interpretation, Justice
Frankfurter for the majority nevertheless did not reach the federal question, but remanded to
allow state courts to consider the issue. His rationale was twofold: First, a state court may so
decide the case as to avoid the federal question altogether, so abstention would serve the end of
avoiding needless federal decisions; and secondly, the intricacies of state law are best left for
state court decision, and federal courts should therefore not waste time rendering "tentative"
state law decisions.
In practice, the abstention doctrine in federal question cases allows the litigant on remand
to "expose" federal issues in state court while reserving his right to reargue them in federal
district court if the state court decides those questions against him. Thus it is said that
abstentioi in federal question cases is a "postponement" and not an "abdication" of federal
jurisdiction, unless the litigant on remand "waives" his right by arguing the federal question
fully in state cnurt. Fngland v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416, 421
(1964). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL COURT 169-77 (1963); Note, Federal
Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 604 (1967).
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upon the use of federal anti-suit injunctions to block the
commencement of state criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, such an
injunction is potentially the most effective means for defensive
assertion of federal rights of political expression against state
prosecutions. In the landmark case of Dombrowski v. Pfisterl such an
injunction issued to prevent the enforcement of a state statute which
abridged first amendment rights by virtue of its unconstitutional
vagueness and overbreadth5 Dombrowski also suggested in dictum
that identical relief is appropriate to prevent bad-faith prosecutions
which inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected freedoms
generally.'
Dombrowski involved the efforts of Louisiana officials to
prosecute members of a civil rights organization under a state
subversive activities control act. Finding this statute unconstitutionally
overbroad, and separately suggesting that bad-faith prosecution under
any statute is improper, the Court held that federal injunction was the
correct remedy, and that abstention was "inappropriate for cases such
as the present one where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their
face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of
discouraging protected activities." 7 Dombrowski thus severely
restricted the applicability of the abstention doctrine. The Court
abandoned its earlier dispositive presumption that state courts would
construe state statutes in accord with the Constitution'-at least
where the statute is on its face vague or overbroad-and apparently
concluded that federal intervention at the outset is essential if it
appears that many state decisions would be necessary in order to
hammer out a constitutional construction of state statutes.9
Dombrowski's analysis of the chilling effect which facially
overbroad statutes have upon the exercise of political expression was a
4. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Id. at 492-96.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), a three-judge court issued the injunction in
Dombrowski. 380 U.S. at 482. That statute provides that only such three-judge courts can
enjoin "the enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute" or administrative order
on the grounds of unconstitutionality by restraining the action of any state official. Passed in
1910, shortly after the Supreme Court had upheld in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a
federal injunction against a state officer by rejecting a challenge that the eleventh amendment
prohibited such interference by federal courts, section 2281 was part of an effort to make certain
that only courts of "special dignity" could so interfere with state activity. See H. M. HART &
H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 847-49 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
6. 380 U.S. at 489-91.
7. Id. at 489-90.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. 380 U.S. at 491-92.
1969]
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new departure which contains the germ of a complex and far-reaching
notion. The Court had much earlier held that the vice of vague or
overbroad statutes is that they not only proscribe constitutionally
regulable activity, but also exceed constitutional boundaries to inhibit
protected activity." The Dombrowski opinion pushed the analysis
further:
We believe that those affected by a statute are entitled to be free of
the burdens of defending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at
hammering out the structure of the statute piecemeal . . . [T]he
reasons for the vagueness doctrine in the area of expression demand
no less than freedom from prosecution prior to a construction
adequate to save the statute."
Thus Dombrowski focused upon the relation of the defendant to the
process of judicial lawmaking, and suggested that when a defendant
must endure a state prosecution in order to vindicate his federal
rights, he is not always receiving enough constitutional protection. At
least where a state statute unconstitutional on its face inhibits free
expression, Dombrowski holds that federal anti-suit injunctions are
available at the outset to prevent the commencement of a state
prosecution.
Dombrowski's principles are obviously capable of tremendous
expansion,'2 and they have become the grounds for injunctive relief in
a great variety of cases involving political expression. Thus, antiwar
demonstrators reclassified from student Il-S status to draft-eligible I-
A status as a penalty for engaging in protest activity have successfully
invoked Dombrowski on the ground that they should not even have to
defend their political activity from attack by reclassification and
inductionY.3 Similarly, Dombrowski has supported a federal injunction
against Georgia's prosecution of a civil rights organization under a
state insurrection statute which forbade, inter alia, circulating
"insurrectionary papers."' 4
Recent cases exploring the Dombrowski doctrine have further
10. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1960).
11. 380 U.S. at 491-92.
12. Realizing the potential breadth of the doctrine that the chilling effect of state
prosecutions for the exercise of constitutional rights warrants injunctive relief, the majority
hedged the new principle thus: "T]he Court has recognized that federal interference with a
State's good-faith administration of its criminal laws if peculiarly inconsistent with our federal
framework. . . . [Tlhe mere possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional
standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to justify a disruption of
orderly state proceedings." Id. at 484-85.
13. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
14. Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 993-94 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
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refined and sometimes confused its implications for anti-suit
injunctions. The Court has held that an appeal which results in a
narrowed and constitutional construction of a facially overbroad
statute does not cure the conviction secured prior to the permissible
construction. 5 One recent lower court decision, however, refused
Dombrowski-type relief where a prior adjudication had found that
defendants prosecuted under an overbroad statute had not engaged in
constitutionally protected activity; 6 and another declared that the
facial defects of an incitement-to-destruction statute were curable in
one prosecution, and so denied injunctive relief against state
proceedings. 7
More recently, in Zwickler v. Koota,5 the Supreme Court held
that the overbreadth of a New York statute prohibiting the printing
or distribution of anonymous political campaign pamphlets was
sufficient ground in itself for a federal injunction against state
prosecution. 9 No additional "special circumstances," such as bad-
faith prosecution, were deemed essential to support a claim for
injunctive relief. Zwickler thus affirms a line of cases descending from
Dombrowski which enjoin state prosecutions under facially void
statutes without finding bad faith in the prosecution. These cases also
indicate that Dombrowski's rationale applies to overbroad statutes
affecting political expression by proscribing action, as well as those
affecting only speech or writing. Thus injunctive relief has prevented
state prosecution under an overbroad disorderly conduct ordinance,2 1
a sedition statute,2 criminal syndicalism acts,22 a "mob action"
statute,' and intimidation statutes 4
Where the statute is constitutional on its face, however, and the
petitioner for injunctive relief charges that the prosecution is
proceeding in bad faith, the harder question arises whether that
element of Dombrowski condemning bad-faith prosecutions is also
15. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 201 (1966) (common law definition of criminal
libel narrowed to valid constitutional specificity only on appeal after conviction; analyzed by
Supreme Court as overbroad statute).
16. Wright v. City of Montgomery, 282 F. Supp. 291, 294 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
17. Turner v. LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443, 446 (D. Conn. 1966).
18. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
19. Id. at 249-50, 254.
20. Hunter v. Allen, 286 F. Supp. 830, 835 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
21. Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. N.C. 1968).
22. Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564, 567, 569 (N.D. Miss. 1967); Harris v. Younger,
281 F. Supp. 507, 510 (C.D. Cal. 1968), prob. juris. noted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1969).
23. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. 111. 1968).
24. Id.
1969]
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enough by itself to support injunctive relief. This question reached the
Supreme Court in Cameron v. Johnson.?' There the Court denied
relief, while upholding in principle this use of the anti-suit injunction.
Cameron involved a Mississippi antipicketing statute which forbade
unreasonable obstruction of entrances to county courthouses. The
state sought to apply it against a group of about 40 pickets who
marched around a courthouse seeking to encourage Negro voter
registration.2 6 Finding the statute constitutional on its face, 7 the
Court affirmed the denial of an anti-suit injunction and held that even
where the first amendment protects the conduct in issue, and the
petitioner so alleges, there is no ground for injunctive relief."8
Accordingly, the Court declined to determine whether the statute as
applied abridged first amendment freedoms. Instead, it emphasized
that "the issue of guilt or innocence is for the state court at the
criminal trial ....
Cameron thoroughly confuses the concept of bad-faith
prosecution. That concept, as it emerged in Dombrowski, seemed to
encompass both the case in which a state statute could not be
constitutionally applied to the claimant because federal law protected
the activity for which he faced state prosectuion, 3" and the situation in
which the claimant had not violated the state law and the prosecutor
lacked probable cause to believe otherwise.3 1 Cameron, however,
rejected the claim of bad-faith prosecution on two new grounds: First,
there was no "selective enforcement" of the law, and any apparent
unevenness in enforcement resulted only from varying police estimates
of the legality of the conduct involved; and second, there was no
police harassment prior to the arrests. 32 However, the Cameron
majority did not hold explicitly that the statute could be
constitutionally applied to the claimants, though the dissent
strenuously argued that it could not be so applied.33 Nor did the
Cameron majority explicitly find that the prosecution had probable
cause to believe that the' claimants had violated the law, though the
25. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
26. Id. at 614-15.
27. Id. at 616.
28. The Court remarked: "Any chilling effect on the picketing as a form of protest and
expression that flows from good-faith enforcement of this valid statute would not . . . constitute
• ..an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms." Id. at 619. See also Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 268, 326, 330 (1969).
29. 390 U.S. at 621.
30. 380 U.S. at 490.
31. Id.
32. 390 U.S. at 619-20.
33. Id. at 627.
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dissent vigorously asserted that there was "no evidence" of violations
of the statute.34 It is not clear whether the Cameron majority intended
quietly to dilute the "strong medicine ' 35 of Dombrowski by confining
federal inquiry to the issues of selective enforcement and police
harassment. Perhaps the Court simply felt that no real issue of
probable cause arose and that the Constitution did not protect the
claimants' activity, so that neither of the Dombrowski inquiries would
have helped their case.
Whatever the Court's intent, its failure to find that both of the
Dombrowski elements of bad faith were absent, coupled with its use
of the proposition that only state courts can determine guilt or
innocence, is unfortunate. A federal court reading Cameron broadly
and Dombrowski narrowly might foreclose an attempt to establish
bad faith by deeming evidence probative of unconstitutional
application or want of probable cause inadmissible because also
determinative of the issue of guilt or innocence-a question which
Cameron pointedly reserved for the state courts. Reading the decision
as a dilution of Dombrowski, a claimant might still argue that the
statute in question had been persistently applied to prohibit protected
activity," and that by implication every such application amounts to
a form of -selective enforcement. But the damage of bad-faith
prosecution seems to occur in precisely the cases Dombrowski
envisioned, when there is no cause to believe that state law has been
violated, or when that law is applied to proscribe federally protected
activities. If Cameron precludes consideration of unconstitutional
application and want of probable cause, then indeed the
"impropriety" of bad-faith prosecution which Dombrowski noted
means very little.
Whatever the theoretical possibilities after Cameron, in only one
case has a federal anti-suit injunction issued to abort a state
prosecution on the ground of bad faith, while several cases deny such
injunctions3 7 Landry v. Daley3 is the maverick case. Landry purports
34. Id. at 624, 626-27.
35. Id. at 623.
36. See Brock v. Schiro, 264 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La. 1967).
37. See Turner v. LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443, 447 (D. Conn. 1966) (incitement to
destruction statute); Dawkins v. Green, 285 F. Supp. 772, 773-74 (N.D. Fla. 1968) (riot and
arson statutes).
38. There are actually four separate Landry opinions, two of which deal with the question
of bad-faith prosecution for disorderly conduct, resisting an officer, and breach of the peace.
Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183, 288 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. I11.), appeal dismissed sub non.
Landry v. Boyle, 393 U.S. 220 (1968). The third Landrv opinion considers the scope of the three-
judge requirement under section 2281 (see note 5 supra) and concludes that where three judges
1969]
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to follow Cameron's limitations on federal court inquiry while
granting an anti-suit injunction against a state prosecution under a
disorderly conduct ordinance. The claimaint, who was chairman of an
urban renewal committee, had sought to enter the spectator section of
the Chicago City Council with about fifty supporters to observe
action upon a petition his group had earlier submitted. Denied access
to the chambers, the claimant later sought admittance alone, only to
be denied entrance by a police officer on the ground that the spectator
gallery was full. The claimant thereupon stated that he would not
leave, and was forthwith arrested for breach of the peace.3
Specifically finding that the claimant had in no way breached the
peace as far as the spectators inside the gallery were concerned, and
that "disturbing policemen is not disorderly conduct,"4 the Landry
court held that the first amendment protected the claimant's conduct
and that the arresting officer had no probable cause to believe a crime
had been committed, and so issued the injunction.4' In a companion
case in which the claimants similarly urged that the state prosecution
was proceeding in bad faith, the district court construed Dombrowski
to demand a factual investigation in all such cases to determine
"[W]hether the conduct of the various plaintiffs was of such nature as
to constitute sufficient cause for prosecution under the statutes or
ordinances . ..or whether these provisions have been enforced .. .
in an improper and discriminatory manner solely for the
purpose of discouraging plaintiffs' exercise of constitutionally
protected activities. ' '4" Landry's requirement of an evidentiary hearing
may well have overstepped the boundaries which Cameron had
imposed upon federal inquiry. Landry did not actually find that the
claimant was innocent under state law, but in holding that the
claimant's acts constituted neither disorderly conduct nor a breach of
the peace, and that the arresting officer had no probable cause to
believe otherwise, Landry necessarily foreclosed argument on the issue
have found challenged statutes facially constitutional, proper procedure allows the court, "as a
matter of discretion," to decline to hear arguments as to unconstitutional application, and to
return the case to a single judge on the question of enjoining state prosecutions for bad-faith
proceedings under valid laws. 288 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 220
(1968). The fourth case contains extended discussion of the powers of federal courts to issue anti-
suit injunctions, and concludes that challenges to bad-faith prosecution require plenary hearings
to find whether probable cause to prosecute exists or whether the threatened prosecutions
constitute an effort to penalize constitutionally protected conduct. 288 F. Supp. 200, 221 (N.D.
III.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 220 (1968).
39. 288 F. Supp. at 191-92.
40. Id. at 192-93.
41. Id. at 193-94.
42. Id. at 221.
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of guilt. Dombrowski's concept of anti-suit injunction to prevent the
commencement of bad-faith prosecution would similarly require that
federal relief occasionally foreclose the issue of guilt from state court
consideration. If Cameron's insistence that federal courts cannot
determine guilt means that they cannot foreclose the issue by hearing
evidence of bad faith which goes also to the question of guilt, then
Landry demonstrates that Cameron's limitation and Dombrowski's
mandate are inherently in conflict. In construing Dombrowski to
require, and Cameron to allow, federal courts to hold a hearing on
the issue of probable cause where a claimant seeks injunctive relief
from alleged bad-faith prosecution, Landry seems to follow the
Cameron dissent, which similarly scrutinized the facts and found that
there was "no evidence" of a violation of the law, 3 instead of the
Cameron majority, which reached no such factual conclusions.
Dombrowski authorizes anti-suit injunctions in order to protect
political expression, but no case has yet held its analysis appropriate
in cases involving issues of racial equality. Yet Dombrowski's
rationale seems equally appropriate to state prosecutions for the
assertive exercise of equal rights, particularly those involving equal
access to public accommodations and attempts to secure voting rights
for Negroes. Like most forms of political expression, the assertion of
racial equality at the lunch counter and in voter registration drives
may arguably approach conduct which the state may regulate through
such "housekeeping" laws as breach-of-peace and trespass statutes.
Indeed, these are the laws by which states frequently deter the effective
exercise of equal rights.44 Moreover, these civil rights cases typically
involve not those facially void statutes which are common in political
expression cases, but valid statutes unconsitutionally applied. 5
Therefore, claimants arguing the applicability of the Dombrowski
chilling effect analysis to constitutional claims grounded in the
fourteenth amendment and the civil rights statutes face not only the
objection that the chilling effect logic applies only to first amendment
claims," but also the formidable difficulties of proving bad-faith
enforcement without seeming to cross Cameron's line into arguments
43. 390 U.S. at 624, 626-27.
44. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (obstructing public passages statutes);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace statute). See also Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), in which the Court failed on review to overturn a questionable
application of a breach-of-peace ordinance to a civil rights worker, defeated by the "adequate
state ground" rule, id. at 446; Currie, supra note 28, at 331.
45. See authority cited note 44 supra.
46. Sarfaty v. Nowak, 369 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966). But see United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968) (holding that inasmuch as the death penalty for the federal crime of
19691
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of guilt or innocence. Only in Landry has a claimant accomplished
this feat, and it is hardly likely that the full implications of both cases
can coexist as compatible principles for long.
In summary, federal injunctive relief from imminent state
criminal prosecutions is available under Dombrowski to prevent
facially invalid statutes from inhibiting protected political expression.
Dombrowski further suggests that such relief can prevent
unconstitutional application of valid statutes and groundless
prosecution which threaten political expression, but Cameron
undercuts this suggestion, and in fact only one case has accorded
relief in the absence of a facially void statute. Dombrowski should
also protect the assertion of rights of racial equality, but no case has
extended anti-suit injunctions to block the commencement of state
proceedings in this area. Such an extension is unlikely under present
practice. The rights of equality most need protection from groundless
prosecution and unconstitutional application of valid laws, but this is
precisely the area in which federal courts are reluctant to protect even
political expression.
2. Injunctions Preventing the Continuance of State Prosecutions
Applicants for the second variety of injunctive relief-that which
prevents the continuance of state court proceedings already in
progress-face the formidable barrier of the anti-injunction statute,
which in general terms prohibits federal injunctions aimed at state
proceedings4 7 Despite its language, the statute's ban is not absolute.
The Supreme Court has said that it is not jurisdictional at all, but
only a limitation upon the exercise of equity jurisdiction which is
inapplicable to suits brought by the United States.18 The Fourth
Circuit has held the prohibition to be avoidable in the face of
"compelling reasons" for injunctive reliefY' Further, Dombrowski
avoided the ban by plainly holding that the invocation of federal
jurisdiction prior to commencement of state proceedings causes the
subsequent award of relief to relate back to the federal filing date.' "
kidnapping is possible only where the accused asserts his innocence and demands a jury, this
gruesome possibility "chills" his fifth amendment right to demand a jury trial, and in the
absence of other overriding justification for imposing the choice, it is unconstitutional to present
the accused with such a dilemma).
47. The anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of' Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
48. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
49. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (4th Cir. 1964).
50. 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
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The anti-suit injunction may therefore block the continuance of state
proceedings which have in fact progressed after the claimant filed for
federal relief, while in form blocking only their commencement.
Assuming, however, that a claimant seeking a federal forum fails
to bring action for injunctive relief prior to the commencement of state
proceedings, the question arises whether the anti-injunction statute is a
complete bar. It is not. Contained within the statute is an exception
for relief where "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," 5' and a
claimant may bring himself within this exception under a statute
general in its terms, for it is established that such a statute may
"expressly" authorize an exception without referring by its terms to
the anti-injunction statute.12 In the civil context, parties seeking
enforcement of such federal laws as the Securities Exchange Act have
obtained federal anti-suit injunctions which interrupted state court
litigation on the ground that the federal interest in effective federal
economic regulation overshadows the policy of the anti-injunction
statute, and the statutory power of federal courts to issue injunctions
in such cases constitutes an "express exception" to the anti-injunction
statute5 3
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). The other exception-for injunctions "necessary in aid of
jurisdiction"--is not helpful in the case of claims raised to prevent criminal prosecutions, for it
has application only in in rem actions. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922), held
that prior federal jurisdiction over an in personam controversy is not impaired by a second
parallel suit in a state court seeking to determine the same controversy between the same parties,
and that prior federal jurisdiction is grounds for enjoining subsequent and parallel proceedings
only when the action is in rem. Almost twenty years later the Supreme Court cut back federal
authority to enjoin state court proceedings even where the state proceeding ignored res judicata
effects of a prior federal adjudication and relitigated the controversy, but the Court expressly
approved Kline's in rem exception. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135
(1940).
When, in 1948, the anti-injunction statute was revised as the present 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1964), the Revisor's Note suggested that the new section restored the pre-Toucey law, including
(by implication) the in rem limitation upon the prior jurisdiction exception to the anti-injunction
statute. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5. at 1075. Chief Justice Warren has'argued that
the revised section 2283 clearly enlarges the possibilities for federal injunctions, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 523 (1955) (dissenting opinion),
but there is now a clear lower court holding that the Kline limitation is still good law. Hyde
Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508 (10th Cir. 1968). If the Kline limitation were
removed, then an argument could be advanced that a petition for federal anti-suit injunction
iled after state proceedings had commenced might be valid to preserve federal jurisdiction over
claims arising under, e.g., section 1983.
52. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516
(1955).
53. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1966). The Bankruptcy,
Interpleader, and Limitation of Liability Acts, inter alia, have also been found to be exceptions
"expressly authorized by Act of Congress." See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS-CASES AND
MATERIALS 562-63 (1968).
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Several courts have found other "express exceptions" in various
civil rights acts. Thus, the Fifth Circuit in Dilworth v. Rine' has
held that the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act
of 196415 is such an exception5 6 In Dilworth, 18 Negro defendants had
sought service in Tom's Restaurant in Mississippi. Informed that they
could get service only by sitting in a section reserved for Negroes,
they refused to go to that section or to leave the restaurant. They were
arrested and charged with the "breach of the peace type"57 crime of
refusing to leave the premises after having been requested to do so.
The defendants sought and obtained a federal injunction against the
continuance of state prosecution against them. The Dilworth court
reasoned that the public accommodations section not only guarantees
equal access as a matter of right, but that its provision forbidding any
attempt to penalize any person who seeks to exercise that right
peaceably also requires the abatement of any effort to prosecute such
a person.58 The court concluded that claimants peaceably exercising
their right to equal access '"may simply not be punished and
prosecution is punishment." 59
Whether section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187160 with its
broad protection of all constitutional rights, is similarly an "express
exception" to the anti-injunction statute remains an open question.
The Third Circuit has indicated in passing that it is," but a line of
54. 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-2 (Supp. III, 1965-67). Section 2000a provides in part:
"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment . . . of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion,
or national origin." Section 2000a-2 provides in part: "No person shall . . . punish or attempt to
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section
2000a ....
56. 343 F.2d at 231.
57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 230. The Court relied upon Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315
(1964), which had construed the public accommodations provision to require abatement of state
prosecution which commenced after enactment of the section even though the conduct involved
had occurred prior to enactment.
59. 343 F.2d at 231.
60. Enacted originally as part of the mass of civil rights legislation which emerged from
the Reconstruction Congress, the present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to the subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, sliall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
61. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1950). No injunction issued, but the
court of appeals ordered the district court to retain jurisdiction until the state court had
considered the constitutional issues presented.
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cases culminating in the Fourth Circuit's careful opinion in Baines v.
City of Danville2 concluded that section 1983 could not be such an
exception. In Baines the claimants had sought to enjoin 105 criminal
prosecutions for violations of ordinances regulating picketing, requiring
parade permits, and limiting the number of participants in
demonstrations. For four, days demonstrations in Danville had
proceeded without incident, but on the fifth day demonstrators
invaded the county courthouse and, after several arrests, turned to
violence and destruction of property.13 The claimants argued that the
state prosecutions infringed first amendment freedoms in violation of
section 1983. Affirming the district court's order denying the
injunction, the court of appeals reasoned that if every grant of equity
jurisdiction under which injunctions could issue were construed as an
express exception to the anti-injunction statute, there would remain
nothing to the prohibition of the statute but an empty shell: It would
prohibit federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings except
where federal courts have power to issue injunctions-a meaningless
prohibition. 4
Nevertheless, Baines does not foreclose the issue. The district
court in Landry v. Daley5 refused to dismiss a claim for injunctive
relief against the continuance of state proceedings, relying upon
Dombrowski as a mandate to use section 1983 to prevent the
unconstitutional application of state statutes in first amendment cases.
Landry reasoned that the Reconstruction Congress which passed
section 1983 must have intended to modify the policy of the anti-
injunction statute, which dates back to 1793.66 Dismissing as "highly
speculative ' 6 7 the argument that Cameron limits Dombrowski,"
Landry rejected the notion that the availability of injunctive relief
depends upon whether a claimant reaches federal court before or after
the commencement of state proceedings, labeling such a limitation
"anomalous.""' The strength of Landry as authority is doubtful,70 but
62. 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964) and cases therein cited.
63. Id. at 582-84.
64. Id. at 589. See also Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74
HARV. L. REv. 726, 738 (1961), which concluded that if section 1983 were an express exception
to the anti-injunction statute, "it could lead to frequent disruption of state criminal proceedings.
Every question of procedural due process might provide a basis for delay of state administration
of justice."
65. 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. 111. 1968). See note 38 supra.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Id. at 220.
68. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
69. 288 F. Supp. at 224.
70. See text accompanying notes 25-43 supra.
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the Supreme Court has recently twice noted the question of whether
section 1983 is a potential "express exception" to the anti-injunction
statute without deciding the issue.7' Thus, a reexamination of the
Cameron doctrine in the context of the conflicting policies of the anti-
injunction statute and section 1983 may be imminent.
Dilworth charts the course for circumventing the anti-injunction
statute in cases involving rights of racial equality, and Landry
suggests a path for avoiding the statute where claimants assert first
amendment rights under section 1983. In the context of removal,
shortly to be explored, 72 the Supreme Court has considered and
accepted the Dilworth rationale, but only where federal law both
provides a right and prohibits penalties for the exercise of the
right73-the theory being that in such cases federal law "substitutes a
right for a crime." 74 The utility of the Dilworth principle is tied to
equal access cases. Although other civil rights laws, such as the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 7 also prohibit punishment for exercising
protected rights, the Supreme Court has not yet characterized any
statute other than the public accommodations provision as one
"substituting a right for a crime." '76
Whether Landry's reading of section 1983 as an "express
exception" to the anti-injunction statute will survive remains to be
seen. Landry's claim that it is anomalous to distinguish between
efforts to secure anti-suit injunctions before and after commencement
of state proceedings ignores the interest of the state in maintaining an
orderly court calendar, for if a claimant could at any time seek
injunctive relief, he could clearly wait until the eve of judgment to do
so. Limiting his federal relief to the pre-proceeding stage at least puts
a premium upon early efforts to secure federal intervention, and
decreases the disruptive effect upon state proceedings. Yet Dilworth
71. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
611, 613 n.3 (1968).
72. See text accompanying notes 78-102 infra.
73. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
74. Id. at 805.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964) provides in pertinent part: "All citizens of the United States
who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State . ..shall
be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (Supp. III, 1965-67) adds: "No person
• .. shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce .. . any person for voting or attempting to vote
76. In Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), the Court considered the Voting
Rights Act but did not find that it worked such a transmutation, although four dissenting
Justices urged that the antipenalty provision in section 1973i(b) (see note 75 supra) plainly
makes the act of prosecution for the exercise of the right to vote a denial in itself of a federal
right. Id. at 847-48.
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plainly permits such a disruption in equal access cases and, if section
1983 is not to be an "express exception," the first amendment rights
which Dombrowski's innovative doctrine sought to support will lose
federal protection upon the fortuity that the state indictment preceded
the claimant's filing for federal relief7
B. Removal Under the Civil Rights Removal Act
When a state criminal prosecution involving "equal civil rights"
has reached the "proceedings" stage and therefore falls under the
protective umbrella of the anti-injunction statute, petitioners seeking a
federal forum may look to section 1443, title 28, United States Code,
the Civil Rights Removal Act. Removal differs procedurally from
injunctive relief: The act of filing in federal court coupled with
notification of the adverse party and the state court halts the state
proceeding automatically7 8 without any hearing in federal court.
Argument on the propriety of removal follows in the federal court,
which remands the case to the state court if removal was improper.79
Anti-suit injunctions, on the other hand, are not automatic, but issue
only after the claimant has proved that he is entitled to relief. Section
1443 provides in pertinent part:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the
district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of such State a right tinder any law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within
the jurisdiction thereof ....
Professor Amsterdam, in an exhaustive study of this provision,
labeled it a "text of exquisite obscurity. 80 At the outset it plainly
appears that the statute does not on its face accord the special remedy
of removal to claimants asserting those rights of political expression
which Dombrowski protected by injunction under section 1983.
Rather, the statute provides a remedy to protect the rights of equality.
The fundamental problems of construction are to delineate the
77. The fact that pre-indictment injunctive relief may be equally disruptive makes the
distinction all the more anomalous. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1964).
80. Amsterdam, Crininal Prosecutions Aijecting Federally Guaranteed (ivil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 793, 843 (1965).
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meaning of the phrase "is denied or cannot enforce" and to determine
which of those laws protecting equality are included in the phrase
"any law providing for equal civil rights."8' The phrase "is denied or
cannot enforce" implies both a present and a prospective denial of
81. Complex statutory history compounds the problem of interpreting the phrase. The
predecessor of section 1443 was part of the First Civil Rights Act (1866), which provided that
all persons born in the United States (excluding Indians not taxed) have the same right to make
and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, buy, sell, hold, and lease real and personal property,
"and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27. The
quoted segment remains unchanged in the present 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
After ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, Congress reenacted all of the First
Civil Rights Act in section 18 of the Second Civil Rights Act (1870), separately reiterating in
section 16 the nonproprietary rights protected by the first act, adding in sections one through six
the right to vote, with private and criminal sanctions against any person who infringes that
right, and providing in section 16 a prohibition against discriminatory taxation of aliens. Act or
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 1-6, 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140-44.
The Third Civil Rights Act (1871) broadened the remedial provisions of the second act by
providing that "any person who, under color of any law . . . of any State . . .shall subject any
person . .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . .shall [any State law to the contrary notwithstanding] be liable" to the injured
party in law or equity. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. This is the predecessor of
the present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See note 60 supra.
Throughout these changes, the removal provision, which in its original form referred not to
deprivations of rights "under any law providing for equal civil rights" but rather to "the rights
secured ... by the first section of this act" (i.e., the Civil Rights Act of 1866), remained
unaltered. Plainly it did not then refer to the Third Civil Rights Act (1871), which has become
in part the modern section 1983.
However, in 1875 Congress revised the statutes, carrying forward the removal provision and
the substantive provisions in separate titles of the code. This revision necessitated the change in
the language of the removal provision, which could no longer refer to "the rights secured by
I .. this act," and which thenceforth referred instead to "any right secured .. .by any law
providing for the equal rights of citizens," REv. STAT. § 641 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964),
shortened in 1948 to the present phrase "a right under any law providing for the equal civil
rights" of all persons. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964). See Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 827 n.148,
828 n.150.
The major Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, which sought to secure equal
access to public accommodations and to penalize people who impeded such equal access,
survived only eight years before the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
declared the act unconstitutional over Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent. This act made no
reference to the removal provison.
The question arises, then, which of these acts and the subsequent civil rights legislation does
the phrase "a right under any law providing for equal civil rights" encompass? Arguably, the
present section 1983, which originated in the Act of 1871, falls in that limbo of time in which
the removal provision still referred expressly only to the rights secured by the original Act of
1866, and the 1875 revision of the language of the removal provision did not incorporate section
1983 because of the Reviser's apparent intent to work no change. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384
U.S. 780, 789-90 (1966). Only subsequent statutes, such as the Act of 1875, could be included,
because by then Congress in enacting them must have known that they would fit within the
generic phrase "any law."
Professor Amsterdam urged that the phrase "any law" should include not only those laws
explicitly protecting equality of rights, but also such laws "whose purpose was to protect the
Negro and assure his civil rights" (emphasis added), whether or not phrased in terms of
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rights, 2 but the language is nevertheless ambiguous. It does not by its
terms specify that the denial of a right may occur when its exercise is
interrupted by "mesne process "8:--arrest and application of law at
the enforcement level-or only when a defendant cannot later
vindicate his rights during a state trial on the merits. In resolving this
question in the context of equal rights the Court faced the same issue
which confronted Dombrowski in the context of political expression:
Whether the mere fact of state prosecution, regardless of its outcome,
so violates the claimant's rights as to justify federal protective
intervention.
The other troublesome problem of construction posed by section
1443-to determine which are the laws that "provide for equal civil
rights"-leads to the question of whether the statute refers only to
those laws phrased in terms of equality, or includes also those laws
whose purpose was to secure equality."4 Section 1981, which
guarantees all people the same right to contract, litigate, give
evidence, and benefit from all laws and proceedings "as is enjoyed by
white people, ' s5 is plainly a law which "provides for equal civil
rights." It is not, however, clear that the drafters of the removal
provision meant to include statutes such as section 1983 which
provide redress for violations of any federal right, but which the
Reconstruction Congress enacted for the purpose of protecting
equality.8
In Georgia v. RacheP7 and Greenwood v. Peacock" the Supreme
Court gave definitive answers to the questions of construction which
the removal provision raised, and in the process affirmed the severe
limitations earlier placed upon the utility of the statute. It construed
equality. Such construction would include section 1983 insofar as it protects nonproprietary civil
rights. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 866-74.
Another commentator suggested an approach later echoed by Justice Douglas, writing for
four dissenters in Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 841 n.4, 847-48 (1965). The original
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 securing to all "the same right . . .to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white persons," is so closely related to the purposes and protections of the fourteenth
amendment that the aim in interpreting section 1443 should be to determine whether the state
law sought to be applied by the state court is by its terms and in application non-discriminatory.
See Johnson, Removal oJ (ivil Rights Cases Jroin State to Federal Courts: Tie Matrix of
Section 1443, 26 FED. B.J. 99, 128-31 (1966).
82. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1965).
83. See Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 910.
84. Id. at 866.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964). See note 81 supra for the history of this provision.
86. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 872. See also note 81 supra.
87. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
88. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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the phrase "is denied or cannot enforce" to limit removal to cases in
which a claimant can demonstrate that he can neither enforce nor
vindicate his right in a state court.89 It limited the phrase "any law
providing for equal civil rights" to include only those laws which by
their terms provide for equality," thus including sections 197 1 and
1981, 1 but excluding section 1983.92
Rachel involved a state trespass arrest of Negroes seeking service
in privately-owned restaurants in Atlanta, Georgia. 3 Peacock
presented the more complex problem of a voter registration march
which resulted in the arrest of 14 people on charges of obstructing the
public streets in violation of a state statute. 4 Finding in Rachel that
the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 196411
not only protects equal access to public facilities, but also forbids
prosecution for the exercise of the right of equal access in refusing to
leave a segregated lunch counter,96 the Court upheld removal. 7
Finding in a statute protecting equal voting rights no similarly-
articulated proscription of prosecution for exercising those rights by
marching in a street, the Peacock court denied removal. 8 Peacock's
construction of section 1443 vindicated the interpretation which the
Court had announced in the companion cases of Strauder v. West
Virginia" and Virginia v. Rives10 in 1880. Both Strauder and Rives
involved jury discrimination in the South, but the Court granted
removal only in Strauder, where a West Virginia statute by its terms
excluded Negroes from juries.'"' Rives denied removal where
segregation in juries was de facto only.'"'
89. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 799-800 (1966).
90. Id. at 792.
91. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 825 (1966). 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964) provides
in part: "All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any
election by the people in any State . . .shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such
elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude ...... For a
summary of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), see note 81 supra.
92. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966). For full text of section 1983, see note 60
supra.
93. 384 U.S. at 783.
94. 384 U.S. at 810-11.
95. See note 55 supra.
96. In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), the Court had earlier held that
the supremacy clause precluded state prosecution because the very terms of the Civil Rights Act
prohibit "any attempt to punish" persons exercising rights protected under the Act. Id. at 311.
97. 384 U.S. at 804-05.
98. 384 U.S. at 827-28.
99. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
100. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
101. 100 U.S. at 312.
102. 100 U.S. at 323. The purely procedural dilemma which section 1443 poses is
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Rachel and Peacock draw a finely-honed distinction. Some
federal laws phrased in terms of equality forbid prosecution for acts
essential to the exercise of the rights they protect. In state
prosecutions endangering those rights Rachel permits removal. Other
federal laws similarly phrased do not forbid state prosecution for the
exercise of the rights they protect-even though these rights may be
equally susceptible to state abridgement. In state prosecutions
threatening the latter rights, Peacock denies removal.
C. Common Problems of Advance Certainty
Injunctions such as those in Dombrowski and Zwickler, and
removal in such cases as Strauder and Rachel, differ from each other
procedurally, 03 protect different arrays of rights,104 and interrupt state
processes at different stages; "5 but the two remedies remain strikingly
similar in that they impose identical burdens of proof upon would-be
claimaints, and effect the same result. Thus, a claimant seeking either
injunction or removal must generally show a flaw in the state
prosecution, such as a facially void statute as in Dombrowski
(injunction) and Strauder (removal). In each case the successful
claimant energes free from prosecutions threatening his federal
rights. '.
There are actually two routes by which a claimant may obtain
relief by injunction or removal: He may demonstrate either an element
of certainty in advance of federal fact finding, such as that which a
facially unconstitutional statute provides, that a state court will deny
underscored by the fact that de facto segregated juries violate the fourteenth amendment and
provide ground for reversal. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). Yet by the Peacock
construction, even today such a ground would not support removal.
103. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
104. Anti-suit injunctions blocking commencement of state proceedings protect first
amendment guarantees. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra. Anti-suit injunctions blocking
continuance of state proceedings protect equal access rights, and perhaps first amendment rights
if Landry remains good law. See text accompanying notes 72-77 supra. Removal protects only
rights of racial equality. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
106. Anti-suit injunctions can vitiate substantive charges against the claimant, but cannot
forestall unconstitutional procedures in state proceedings. Compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (decree prohibiting enforcement of certain sections of the state subversive
activities act) with Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1951) (denying injunctive relief
against the admission in evidence of illegally seized property in state prosecutions) and Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 400 (1963) (reversing an injunction forbidding a state officer from
testifying to evidence gathered by federal officers, and noting that Stefanelli survives even the
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), exclusionary rule). On the other hand, removal may correct
even state procedures where a statute prescribes a racially discriminatory practice, as in
Strauder.
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his federal rights; or the existence of a right not to be prosecuted for
his exercise of a federal right. The claimants in Strauder (removal)
and Dombrowski (injunction) obtained their remedies by passing the
advance certainty test. 0 7 In Dombrowski the Court found advance
certainty that the continued operation of an overbroad statute would
abridge first amendment freedoms, and that state courts could not
quickly rectify matters by adequately narrow construction. It
remarked:
[T]he mere possibility of erroneous initial application of
constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable
injury necessary to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings
[When statutes have an overbroad sweep] the assumption
that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample
vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded.""5
In contrast to Strauder and Dombrowski, the claimants failed
the advance certainty test in Peacock (removal denied) and Cameron
(injunction denied). It is insufficient, Justice Stewart remarked for the
Peacock majority, to allege or even to show "that the defendant is
unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court."""' Rather, he
must satisfy himself with proceeding in a state court except "where it
can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a persuasive
and explicit state or federal law""" that he will be denied his federal
rights by the mere fact of prosecution. Similarly, Justice Brennan
noted for the Cameron majority that the "mere possibility" of
unconstitutional application of a facially constitutional state statute
does not suffice as a ground for anti-suit injunction."'
The defendant in Rachel, however, went the second route to
obtain removal and faced no advance certainty barrier in the process.
The distinction between Rachel and Peacock, Justice stewart
explained, was the existence of the federal right not to be prosecuted
107. In Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), decided as a companion case to Strauder,
the Court denied removal and contrasted the advance certainty which a statute provides with the
speculative uncertainty that nonstatutory procedure provides, remarking: "[l~n the absence of
constitutional or legislative impediments [a defendant] cannot swear before his case comes to
trial that his enjoyment of all his civil rights are denied to him. When he has only an
apprehension . . . he cannot affirm that they are actually denied, or that he cannot enforce
them." Id. at 320.
108. 380 U.S. at 484-86.
109. 384 U.S. at 827.
110. Id. at 828.
III. 390 U.S. at 621.
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for seeking equal access to public accommodations. '2 This distinction,
however, does not go to the question of certainty in advance of federal
fact finding, which was totally absent in Rachel. There the Court was
obliged to remand the case to the district court to determine whether
the defendant was seeking equal service or was committing an act of
trespass which a state could penalize without violating federal law and
the supremacy clause. Thus, the Court has refused both injunction
and removal where the claimant has failed the advance certainty test,
apparently closing inquiry at that point, while implicitly conceding in
Rachel that such certainty is not always a prerequisite.'"3 On the
removal question in equal access cases, the Rachel Court aligned itself
with the earlier reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Dilworth,"' which
had upheld a federal injunction against the continuance of state
proceedings in an equal access case. Dilworth and Rachel reached the
same result through identical reasoning, the former finding equal
access cases to be within an "express exception" to the anti-injunction
statute, the latter finding equal access cases an exception to the
advance certainty requirement. Rachel did not cite Dilworth, but the
two cases demonstrate the parallel evolution of the two remedies.
The advance certainty barrier serves the principle of duality
within the federal scheme by severely limiting the occasions upon
which federal courts will interfere in a state criminal proceeding.
Indeed, the advance certainty test, like federal question abstention in
cases reaching the Supreme Court from the states," 5 has no other
purpose. The tangible value of the duality principle as preserved by
the advance certainty test is that it prevents disruption of state court
calendars by litigants grasping at procedural straws to delay state
adjudication, and it saves state prosecutors from the task of justifying
in federal court each criminal charge they plan to pursue. Less
tangibly, deference to the duality principle prevents corrosion of the
112. 384 U.S. at 826-27.
113. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Peacock dissenters, pointed out that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (Supp. 1, 1965-66), prohibits all attempts to intimidate
any person for voting or attempting to vote. 384 U.S. at 847. Thus the distinction between
Rachels focus upon the statute prohibiting any person from penalizing another for exercising
the right to equal access and Peacock's holding that no such right to be free of prosecution exists
in the voting situation appears to be thin indeed, depending upon minute differences in statutory
language. See Note, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1159, 1164 (1967). Phrased another way, Rachel
begged the question whether the defendant had trespassed or merely exercised his right to equal
access, holding that prosecution for exercising the latter right is prohibited; and Peacock begged
the question whether a person could be prosecuted for exercising the right to vote, holding that
prosecution for marching in a street is not prohibited.
114. 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965). See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
115. See note 3 supra.
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relations between federal and state judiciaries by minimizing
jurisdictional disputes. The consequence of the advance certainty test
is that it prevents federal courts from pretrying state cases by
confining federal inquiry to the issue of the facial constitutionality of
a state statute. These legitimate values of the duality principle are
subordinated to the interests of the defendant who comes as a
petitioner to the federal court and satisfies the advance certainty test.
The existence of a facially void statute satisfies the test, for it
convinces federal courts thht federal relief is essential to preserve the
petitioner's federal rights, thereby justifying the disruption which
advance federal relief causes.
The one recognized generic exception to the advance certainty
barrier is the circumstance in which a federal statute which
transmutes a crime into a right precludes state prosecution. Equal
access cases are the only present example of this exception. Of course
these cases constitute an exception to the fact-finding ban which the
advance certainty test imposes upon the federal forum, thereby
allowing initial federal interruption of state processes where it is not
certain that federal intervention will be essential. If, as Landry holds,
claimants seeking an anti-suit injunction under section 1983 on
grounds of unconstitutional application of a state statute can require
the federal court to find facts to determine whether the statute is being
so applied, then the breach in the advance certainty barrier is much
greater.
Since the purpose of the advance certainty test and any
applicable exception is properly to adjust the competing federal
principles of duality and supremacy, the compelling question is
whether the law has done so. The argument of the opinions of Rachel
and Dilworth-that Congress has substituted the right of equal access
for the crime of criminal trespass in public accommodations, in effect
creating a shielding right to protect the substantive right from
prosecution-is unsatisfactory for three principal reasons. First, there
are many shielding rights which the Court has not construed as
exceptions to the advance certainty test. For example, Congress
similarly protected the right to vote in the Voting Rights Act of
1965116 but the Court did not recognize an exception to the advance
certainty test in voting cases. Further, section 1983 itself creates no
"substantive" rights, but provides only a remedy by which claimants
may redress invasions of substantive rights secured elsewhere. Yet the
Court has not held that section 1983 is another exception to the
116. See note 75 supra.
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advance certainty test. Therefore, the distinction between those
shielding rights which justify immediate federal factual inquiry and
those which do not turns upon a form of expression: The federal
statute which provides, "No person shall . . . punish""' 7 justifies federal
factual inquiry at the outset, while the federal statute which provides,
"[e]very person who . . . [deprives another] of rights . . . shall be
liable""' requires obeisance to the advance certainty principle.
Secondly, it is far from clear that equal access rights are uniquely
important or uniquely susceptible to state abuse. In forging the
shielding rights notion, the Court nowhere urged that equal access
rights were in any other sense unique. To the extent that the shielding
rights rationale is flimsy, the absence of a basis for distinguishing the
equal access cases is fatal to the logic which establishes those cases as
the only exception to the advance certainty rule.
Third, the equal access exception demonstrates that federal courts
can legitimately look beyond the face of a state statute to the facts
giving rise to the prosecution and indeed must do so to accord initial
federal protection for some federal rights. In these cases it is the
unconstitutional application of facially valid state statutes which
endangers a federal right, and it is the examination of facts rather
than the scrutiny of statutory language which is vital to the protection
of the right. Plainly a federal court which can block a state
prosecution by finding a statute void on its face has interfered less
with the traditional function of state court criminal adjudication and
has intruded less deeply into the fact finding process than a federal
court which must examine the evidence underlying a state prosecution
to determine whether a valid statute may be constitutionally applied
to a defendant. In this sense the task of a federal court in void-statute
cases is easier than its job in any other case. But the equal access
exception proves that the presence of facially void statutes is not the
only warning signal that initial federal relief will be essential. Indeed, it
appears that initial relief by anti-suit injunction or removal is all the
more necessary in cases-like those involving equal access-of
unconstitutional application of statutes; for subsequent relief upon
direct or collateral review is hamstrung by the completion of the
crucial process of fact finding by another forum. Therefore, although
the restriction of initial federal relief to cases involving void statutes
serves the practical purpose of making federal intervention available
only in the easiest cases, the equal access exception shows that this
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1964). See note 55 supra.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See note 60 supra.
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restriction is too severe, and indeed that the restriction may well
exclude from initial federal scrutiny those cases which most need it.
II
RIGHTS OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND RACIAL EQUALITY WITHIN
THE FEDERAL SCHEME
The rationale limiting the availability of removal and anti-suit
injunctions ultimately depends upon anaysis of the competing
elements of federalism. To the extent that the rights of political
expression and racial equality are inadequately protected, it is fair to
say that the duality principle-which speaks in terms of the separate
functions of state and federal judiciaries-has in effect overshadowed
the equally important supremacy principle-which demands the
vindication of federal rights, contrary state law notwithstanding.
A. Racial Equality and Political Expression Versus the Duality
Principle
The advance certainty rule is a pragmatic expression of the
duality principle, while the shielding rights exception is, in contrast, a
pragmatic assertion of the supremacy principle. At present, only the
equal access statute brings cases within the shielding rights exception.
Insofar as that statute is not convincingly distinguishable from section
1971's protection of equal voting rights or section 1983's protection
of the whole panoply of constitutional rights,"9 the problem which
next arises is to describe the array of rights which should properly
constitute an exception to the duality principle in the context of the
remedies of federal injunction and removal.
Modern versions of the duality principle emphasize the integrity
of the separate state and federal judicial systems and stress that the
conflict is between upholding individual rights by federal intervention
and maintaining the separate functions of the two systems. Justice
Frankfurter's abstention doctrine 2° best articulates the modern
version of the duality principle which the advance certainty test is
designed to preserve. Frankfurter believed that even where cases raise
"sensitive" constitutional issues the federal judiciary must abstain
from decision where state courts might either narrow state statutes so
as to avoid federal questions altogether or correctly dispose of such
questions on their merits, thus making federal decision of those same
119. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
120. See note 3 supra.
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questions unnecessary . 2' This application of the duality principle has
its roots in Jeffersonian federal theory,122 which held that state and
national governments perform distinct and separate functions, neatly
divided by the line between foreign and domestic affairs.123 Implicitly
following this separate function logic, Frankfurther argued that even
in cases raising federal issues of racial discrimination the full gamut
of state legal processes, from legislating through enforcement to final
adjudication, must run its course before federal authority can intrude
to protect federal rights.12 1
This "hands off" policy, 12 5 which protects the separation of
functions between state and federal courts, is reflected in the opinions
of Rachel, Peacock, and Cameron. In refusing to consider that rights
might be denied on the streets by mesne process, ' 2  in then focusing
perforce upon in-court denials of rights, and in noting finally that the
removal statute "does not permit the judges of the federal court to
put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial," Peacock narrowly
construed the meaning of the broad remedial terms of section 1443.127
Given the advance certainty test, the narrow inquiry into in-court
denials of rights, and the Court's final unwillingness to estimate the
fairness of state courts, there can be little doubt that the Court
believes essential the separation between the functions of state and
federal courts, and holds that this separation precludes early federal
relief from even wrongful state criminal prosecution.
The separate function theory operates on the assumption that
state court fairness will allow adequate protection for federal rights.
Where truly individual rights are at stake, there is little reason to
dispute this assumption, and the most forceful arguments for
separation of functions have presumed that the competition is between
local responsibility for the protection of federal rights and federal
intervention to protect such rights.' 8 Frankfurter made this point
121. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
122. See Comment, Theories oJ Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1024-29
(1966).
123. Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Division oJ Powers, in AREA AND POWER
150, 166, 168-69, 172 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
124. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
125. In these words Justice Frankfurter described congressional policy against federal
interference by injunction in state proceedings. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118, 132 (1941).
126. Rachel had construed the phrase "is denied or cannot enforce" to exclude out-of-
court denials of rights. See text accompanying notes 82-86, 89 supra.
127. 384 U.S. at 828.
128. See B. MARSHALL. FEDLIRALIS\1 AND CIIL RIGHTS 8 (1964): "The problem is that
legal concepts have developed in terms of individual personal rights, but the right of masses, of
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explicit in contrasting intrusion by "remote federal authority" with
the more desirable faith in "local responsibility"'' 9 in a case involving
clearly individual rights. He was dissenting from the conviction of
Georgia law enforcement officers on a federal charge for beating a
Negro arrestee. More recently Justice Harlan, acknowledging the
erosion of the "state action" limit upon fourteenth amendment
protections, argued that "values of federalism" require "local
authority" to regulate private relationships. 30
In the context of federal anti-suit injunction and removal,
however, there are two arguments against the separate function
version of the duality principle as well as its underlying assumption
that intervention will further one individual's rights at the prohibitive
cost of invading local responsibility. The first applies to civil rights in
general; the second applies specifically to the rights of political
expression and racial equality.
First, the rapid proliferation of federal rights which the Warren
Court has articulated in destroying the separate-but-equal doctrine,'
and in discarding the "state action" limits which the first Civil
Rights Cases32 had imposed upon congressional power to reach
"private acts" of discrimination'" has so nationalized the array of
civil rights protecting the populace that a continued deference to the
duality of federalism in the area of judicial administration is
an entire race, are affected all at once." See also Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil
Rights, supra note 122, at 1029. Mr. Marshall is a former Assistant United States Attorney
General.
129. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160-61 (1945) (dissenting opinion),
130. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (concurring opinion).
131. The progency of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) have eradicated
the doctrine, inter alia, in public parks, auditoriums, transportation, courtroom seating, voting
places, and public housing. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KANIISAR, & J. CHOPER. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, CASES-QUESTIONS- MATERIALS 1228 (2d ed. 1967). Further, the Court in effect forbade
repeal of state open housing statutes by amendment to the state constitution, Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and has similarly struck down the attempt of Akron, Ohio to
repeal its open housing ordinance by amendment to the city charter, Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969).
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133. As recently as 1961 the Court still spoke only in terms of congressional power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to redress invasions of constitutional rights by "those
who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity," Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961). In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), however,
concurring opinions of six Justices explicitly held that Congress may prohibit individuals from
obstructing fourteenth amendment rights. 383 U.S. at 762, 784. See also Comment, Fourteenth
Amendment Enlbrcement, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 293 (1967), in which the author concludes that
under Guest's "idealistic conception" of constitutional rights, which Congress can articulate and
protect against state and individuals alike, Congress could, "for all practical purposes, abolish
the states." Id. at 302, 315.
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inapposite. The notion that duality means separation of function
founders upon the reality of the enlarged involvement of federal rights
in every facet of national life. Congress is free to expand the
protection of the due process clause, and transmute crimes under state
law into rights under federal law."4 The Supreme Court can reverse
state criminal convictions which rest upon a misapplication of hearsay
rules violating the accused's confrontation rights"5 or upon the
presentation of probative but illegally obtained evidence . 6 In other
words, congressional power to expand and federal judicial power to
protect sensitive federal rights potentially involved in every state
criminal prosecution explodes the theory that separate function is a
viable expression of the duality principle. Dombrowski's recognition
that constitutional rights may be invaded on the street by mere arrest
and subsequent prosecution regardless of whether a state court
ultimately vindicates them is far more consistent with the
nationalization of the citizen's protective array of rights than is the
appeal to separate judicial administration in the name of duality.
Second, the rights of politial expression and racial equality differ
from other federal rights in two respects: They are rights likely to be
asserted in concert by large numbers of people rather than merely by
individuals, and both are peculiarly susceptible to abuse through state
"housekeeping" laws. Since the struggle for equal civil rights and the
wider student effort to call attention to hitherto unaccepted social and
political views involve assertions of equality and of first amendment
rights by and for large numbers of people at once, 13 7 the concept of a
conflict between protecting merely individual rights and nourishing
Certainly there seems no longer to be a constitutional bar to a federal murder statute: Three
men, one of whom had been found innocent by two state juries, were sentenced in federal court
to ten years in prison under a federal conspiracy statute for the murder of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1965, at I, col. 3. Like section 1983, see note 60 supra, the conspiracy
statute under which those convictions were obtained prohibits invasions of any constitutional
right. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). Also among the charges in Guest itself was one for the
murder of Negro educator Lemuel Penn. 383 U.S. at 748.
134. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
135. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
136. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Not only can the Supreme Court recharacterize
the facts found in state criminal adjudications upon direct review, but federal district courts can
conduct full factual inquiries after state convictions. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
the Court held that federal district courts hearing habeas corpus petitions must hold full
evidentiary hearings unless the state court has -reliably found the relevant facts." Id. at 312-13.
137. The phenomenon of massive expression of political sentiment apart from the ballot
box has become commonplace, both on campuses and in city streets, as a few contemporary
examples illustrate. 450 students at a noon rally at San Francisco State College were arrested
for violating a court injunction banning such assemblies. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 24,
1969, at I, col. 8. 5000 persons marched in a peace parade protesting the Vietnam war during
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local responsibility underestimates the urgency and dimensions of the
values of political expression and racial equality which clamor for
federal protection t.13  Moreover, the mere-individual-rights hypothesis
leads to the conclusion that initial local adjudication is as appropriate
as initial federal adjudication, assuming the institutional neutrality of
local agencies. Yet the more accurate view is of the rights of
tremendous numbers asserted in a few representative cases, where such
assumptions are unwarranted. The question of segregation, for
example, affects the entire populace of the South, and southern
forums clearly lack the institutional independence and neutrality to
decide justly the racial conflicts which still literally divide the
community. 39  Similarly, those questions of first amendment
protection for political expression which arise in state criminal
prosecutions are most likely to involve large numbers of claimants
holding hostile views on issues which sharply divide the community,""
such as questions of foreign policy and student rights.
Thus, the protest movements which have impelled the Court to
recognize the place of symbolic speech within the first amendment's
protection' have proved to be a special affront to state authorities
offended both by their tactics4 2 and their causes.13 State authorities
the inauguration of President Nixon. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 20, 1969, at I, col. 7. 1,500
demonstrators at the University of Wisconsin swelled in numbers to 5000 when National Guard
troops appeared on the scene. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1969, at I. col 4. 25,000 joined in an
antiwar Easter parade in New York. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1969, at 23M. col. I. At the same
time in San Francisco, some 20,000 marched to the Presidio to protest the war and the
impending courts martial of in-service activists. San Francisco Chronicle, April 7. 1969. at I,
col. 5.
138. Theories oJ Federalism and Civil Rights, supra note 122, at 1026-27.
139. See M. BERGER, IQUALITY BY STATUTE 148-49 (rev. ed. 1967) (suggesting that only
the "sympathy" of more distant power could justly deal with the race question in the South,
and that local agency could not have done so); L. FRIEDMAN. SOUTHERN JUSTICE (1965);
Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 794-99; Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: 1
Problem in Nullification, 63 Coi.Ui. L. REv. 1163, 1182 (1963) (concluding that litigation in
the South is not the means to secure federal rights).
140. Genuine issues of free political expression substantial enough to survive initial
federal scrutiny clearly arise where outsiders speak unpopular views, and in a real sense it is
only for these that the first amendment guarantee has meaning. See Amsterdam, supra note 80,
at 801.
141. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community District, 37 U.S.L.W. 4121 (U.S.
Feb. 25, 1969).
142. The injunction against the antiwar protest march on the occasion of former President
Johnson's visit to Centur City Plaza in Los Angeles on June 23, 1967 forbade, hier alin,
parading, marching, walking, or stopping in front of the exits of the Century Plaza Hotel, and it
also banned both singing and sound equipment. \( I ' SoI 'gOTili RN CAI II.ORNiA. DAY 0
PROTEST. NIG11T OI- \, IOI.NCi 43 (1967).
143. In the disorder accompanying the I-ree Speech Movement at Berekley in 1964.
University of California officials initially opposed any form of student electioneering which
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have called for federal investigation of student movements,' and
legislatures have hastily passed statutes which strike broadly at
student activism.' There is no reason to suppose that state courts
caught between first amendment claims and the competing community
desire for peace and tranquility can act with greater neutrality in
adjudicating federal defenses against state prosecutions than do
southern courts in segregation cases.
The peculiar susceptibility of the rights of equality and political
expression to collateral abuse under "housekeeping" laws hardly
admits of dispute. The catalogue of statutes which states have used to
secure convictions which the Court later found to violate the first
amendment guarantee of free political expression includes facially
constitutional statutes prohibiting loitering,' breach of the peace,'47
and trespass."' The Supreme Court early decided that where such
statutes are so indefinite that they cannot stand constitutional
scrutiny, the defendant need not prove that his conduct is
constitutionally protected and hence unregulable, but has standing to
involved university facilities. SYnposiun--Studeni Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1966). Perhaps the sit-in cases represent the clearest example of the use of state law
to frustrate not only the manner, but the very aim, of a protest movement. In these cases
facially constitutional statutes (breach-of-peace) became the weapon with which to inhibit
otherwise legal, completely nonviolent and nonobstructive protest. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 370
U.S. 154, 155 (1962). See also examples cited in B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
46-47 (1964).
144. Governor Reagan sponsored a resolution at the National Governors' Conference in
Washington calling for the Department of Justice to make a full investigation into the
"'instigators, the causes and effects of such [campus] violence." The Conference rejected the
proposal, and also defeated it when offered a second time by Governor Williams of Mississippi,
after assurances that the FBI was investigating the problem. Reagan's resolution asked whether
there was "a nationwide plan or organization" behind campus outbreaks. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1969, at I, col. 2.
145. In response to continued turmoil on campuses of state colleges all over California,
Governor Reagan called upon the State Assembly to pass new and stiffer laws penalizing
trespass upon state property, and requiring expulsion of students guilty of "disruption." San
Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 8, 1969, at I, col. 8. In immediate response many legislators
introduced bills to stiffen penalties for infractions of university rules. San Francisco Chronicle,
Jan. 8. 1969, at 10, col. I. California has yet to enact the new laws, which are still in committee.
Seven states have enacted new legislation aimed at campus disorders, two have begun legislative
investigations, and 16 others (including California) have bills in progress. Typically, the new laws
authorize governors to revoke scholarship funds of students involved in demonstrations. Such are
the aims of statutes passed in Maryland, Illinois, and North Carolina. See N.Y. Times, May 4,
1969, at I, col. 5.
146. In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), a Negro defendant, who had been
"shuffling" in time with jukebox music in a cafe without any objection from the proprietor.
who was on the scene, was convicted for violating a loitering ordinance. Finding "no evidence"
of a violation of the ordinance, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 200, 206.
147. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
148. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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assert in his own defense that some protected conduct, even though
not his own, is punishable under the statute."' Understandably the
conduct to which such statutes have been applied includes such
disparate behavior as inflammatory speech, 50 blocking access to
buildings as an incident of picketing,' 5' and verbal abuse of law
enforcement officers. 5 2  More recently the states' response to
demonstrations has included new and narrow "rifle shot" statutes,'
hastily passed to halt immediate and hitherto unanticipated threats to
normal community functions.'54 Enhanced judicial sensitivity to the
sophisticated questions posed by prosecution under housekeeping
statutes spawned the chilling effect doctrine and Rachel's newfound
modification of the narrower precedents interpreting section 1443.
Cameron demonstrates the dilemma of the Court in passing upon
such statutes, which can hardly be definite in their terms' but which
the Court will not strike down wholesale. Therefore, the statutes
continue in force, and the danger of application abusing rights of
equality and political expression persists. The result is that "low-
visibility" constitutional rights' often fail to find protection because,
to the prospective claimant, the burden of a defense which may
ultimately require an appeal to the Supreme Court is even greater
than the punishment under the statute.
In summary, the separate function vision of the duality principle
had its place in a federalism which exists no longer, in a federalism
149. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
150. Turner v. LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D..Conn. 1966).
151. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
152. Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (N.D. II. 1968).
153. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 627 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
154. Six months after the student occupancy of Sproul Hall on the Berkeley campus
which occurred on December 2 and 3, 1964, the California legislature enacted a statute expressly
aimed at preventing future sit-ins in public buildings. CAL. PEN. CODE § 602.7 (West Supp.
1968). The constitutionality of the statute is open to que3tion. See Comment, The University
and the Public: The Right of Nonstudents to Access to University Property, 54 CALIr. L. Ruv.
132, 134-35 (1966). A California court of appeals has held the statute constitutional, People v.
Agnello, 259 Cal. App. 2d 785, 792, 66 Cal. Rptr. 571, 575 (1968), but the California supreme
court has not yet considered the question.
155. Generality of statutory language in vagrancy statutes serves the purpose, for ill or for
good, of arming the policeman with legal authority to use his experienced "sixth sense" to spot
trouble before it fully develops, and to detain or incarcerate suspicious persons prior to the
commission of serious crimes. See Note, Vagrancy: A Constitutional Battle, 16 SYRACuSE L.
REv. 646, 659, 663 (1965). Similar generality in disorderly conduct laws reflects the intent to
deter and penalize minor offences which disrupt the public peace. Inherently such laws leave
tremendous latitude for abuse of federal rights. See Sherry, Vagrants. Rogues, and
Vagabonds-Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CA1.II. L. Ri.x. 557 (1960); Watts, Disorderly,
Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society, 9 WMi. & MARS L. Ri.v. 349 (1967).
156. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52 (1968).
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outmoded by the radical extension of federal rights under the Warren
Court. Further, the analysis of mere individual rights as against state
responsibility mistakes the nature of the demand for federal protection
of rights of equality and political expression which are today asserted
by and for large numbers of people in individual cases. Neither the
separate function application of the duality principle nor the mere-
individual-rights hypothesis which the principle assumes justifies the
view that duality should preciude initial federal relief in criminal cases
encroaching upon the rights of equality and political expression. The
peculiar susceptibility of those rights to the peculiarly vague
housekeeping laws of the states further underscores the special nature
of those rights and their special need for federal protection.
B. Federalist Theories and the Supremacy Principle
While Frankfurter's defense of the principle of duality within the
federal framework fails to deal adequately with the rights of political
expression and racial equality, the early federalists' defense of the
principle of supremacy and Congress' own vision of the meaning of
supremacy in the context of racial equality strongly suggest that
federal courts may justifiably act in certain areas to guard federal
rights from threats of state encroachment by prosecution. Madison
and Hamilton wrote the classic treatise on American federalism,
cleverly choosing The Federalist as the title theme of their essays: The
word "federal" evoked in 18th century America the image of
federated government, with emphasis upon division of powers, local
autonomy, and limited central authority.1 7 Yet the plain purpose
which animated their essays was to persuade a mistrusting public of
the importance of federal supremacy in a scheme which seeks to
reconcile the centrifugal element of duality with, the centripetal
element of supremacy.
The major aspect of central authority upon which Hamilton
insisted was that Congress should pass laws which directly affect the
people-laws whose vitality does not depend upon the mediating
operation of local government. 158 Further, he clearly favored a federal
157. See Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 21, 23-
24(1961).
158. He remarked, "[W]e must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the states in
their collective capacities: We must extend the laws of the Federal Government to the individual
citizens of America." THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 148 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
ThE FEDERALIST]. Hamilton spoke of "rights" and "liberties" but was explicit only about
property rights. G. DirrzE, THE FEDERALIST 146-47 (1961). But he was explicit on the point that
the federal government "must itself be impowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate
to execute its own resolutions." THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra, at 102.
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enforcement arm and a federal judiciary,'59 not only to assure consis-
tent nationwide application of federal law,"'0 but also to counteract
inertia, noncompliance, and active resistance at the state level.",
Madison, like Hamilton, plainly anticipated that federal law would
reach the people directly and that where federal and state laws
conflicted, decisions regarding the proper boundary between federal and
state authority would be made by federal courts.16 2 Madison also went
so far as to suggest that the federal government should be able to
negate all state laws, 163 and his famous theory of warring political
factions'64 led him to condemn local autonomy in which one faction
might hold complete sway in areas too finely subdivided to permit the
balancing influence of opposing factions.165
In contrast, Jefferson and the antifederalists fought for the
duality principle. Jefferson believed that the township, in which people
directly participated in government, was the most perfect form of
republicanism, 66 and this vision colored his whole view of federalism.
The fault of local governments was rather "an excess of liberty" than
of tyranny, toward which vice the central government tended."6 7
Convinced of the virtue of local government, Jeffersoh decided that
the division between domestic and foreign problems was also the
proper boundary between the functions of state and federal
government, and that the spheres of state and federal powers should
nowhere overlap.' To him the institution of judicial review was a
cancer upon republicanism, 6 ' which made the Constitution "a mere
159. THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 158, at 102-03.
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 158, at 1,13-44.
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 158, at 103.
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 158, at 256.
163. See Madison's letters to Washington and to Jefferson, excerpted in G. DIETzE, TIlE
FEDERALIST 86 n.100, 87 n.101 (1960). See also Randolph's presentation of the Virginia Plan to
the Convention in I J. MADISON, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 21 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966).
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 158, at 56-65.
165. Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers, in AREA AND POWER
150, 189-90 (A. Maass ed. 1959). The Supreme Court's deathblow to legalized segregation
might bear out Madison's theory. Arguably, no purely southern faction could have ended
southern segregation, but enough factional support existed in a national context to wipe out at
least legislated segregation. But query whether the sheer weight of Supreme Court authority and
an initial national inertia simply made the public swallow a doctrine which would have gained
only minority support had it been put to a national vote.
166. Letter to John Taylor, May 28, 1816, in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27, 29
(P. Ford ed. 1899).
167. Letter to Archibald Stewart, Dec. 23, 1791, in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
408, 409 (P. Ford ed. 1895).
168. Huntington, supra note 165, at 166, 168-69, 172.
169. See Letter to James Pleasants, Dec. 26, 1821, in l0 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
197, 199 (P. Ford ed. 1899).
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thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary.' 7 For him, the great need
of federalism was to strengthen state governments, which only the
state governments themselves could do, and then only if the central
government stayed its hand. 7 1
While none of the early federalist theories deals directly with
the mode by which the federal judiciary can protect federal supremacy
within the duality of the federal system, Madison and Hamilton
anticipated: First, that local units of government would drag their feet
enforcing federal rights; second, that the federal government was
better suited than state governments to enforce federal law; and third,
that one role of the federal judiciary was to protect federal rights
against recalcitrant state judicial administration. Analyzing federalism
in terms of constituency, 2 and behavior, Hamilton and Madison
concluded that the principle of supremacy was the element of
federalism most in need of protection because most threatened by the
political process. Analyzing federalism in terms of function only,
Jefferson allowed his faith in local government to lead him to the
conclusion that the duality principle was the element of federalism
most threatened and most in need of protection from federal
encroachment.
The supremacy arguments of Hamilton and Madison found
support in the resurgent nationalism of the Radical Republicans after
the Civil War, which spawned both the fourteenth amendment and the
removal provisions construed in Rachel and Peacock.13 Debate in the
Senate and the House of Representatives, focusing upon reports of
discrimination in the South, enphasized in pragmatic terms precisely
the arguments which Hamilton and Madison had advanced in
theoretical terms to defend the supremacy principle: First, state courts
could not be trusted to enforce racial equality; 74 second, federal
courts should have power to enforce racial equality; 75 and third, the
170. Letter to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, in id. at 140, 141. Roane was
Marshall's antagonist in the battle to establish the power of the Supreme Court to review state
court decisions. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 403-07.
171. Letter to Archibald Stewart, supra note 167, at 409-10.
172. Huntington, supra note 165, at 168-69.
173. See note 81 supra.
174. See Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 814-15. Senator Lane remarked:
But why do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because we fear and have
reason to fear that the emancipated slaves would not have their rights in the courts of
the slave States. The State courts already have jurisdiction of every single question that
we propose to give to the courts of the United States. Why then the necessity of
passing the law? Simply because we fear the execution of these laws if left to the State
courts.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 602 (1866).
175. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 827.
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South would not only actively resist federal law but would engage in a
massive campaign against it, not only through facially
unconstitutional statutes, but also through uneven application of
facially valid statutes,t 7 and through custom and mere habit of
mind. 77 The Civil Rights Acts and the removal provision in section
1443 were Congress' answer.
Jefferson's argument for the duality principle found support
neither in judicial doctrine nor in the outcome of the debates of the
Reconstruction Congress. Jeffersonian duality as articulated in the
abstention doctrine-the principle to which the Court paid deference
in Rachel and Peacock- disturbed neither the Reconstruction
Congress nor the state courts 78 which first applied Congress'
pragmatic construction of federal supremacy as expressed in section
1443. Thus, a Negro defendant charged with murdering a white man
in North Carolina successfully invoked the predecessor of section
1443 purely on the ground of local prejudice, and the state court allowed
removal, remarking: "Had the object merely been to prevent
discrimination by the laws of the State, very few words would have
answered the purpose . . . . [Congress intended the statute to] include
cases where, by reason of prejudice in the community, a fair trial
cannot be had in the State courts."'' 79 Similarly, a Texas court, taking
note of the "comprehensive language" of the predecessor of section
1443, commented that even in the absence of facially discriminatory
laws "there may be many localities where the colored man cannot
expect to receive his equal rights under the laws," and allowed
removal. 80
The arguments of the federalists, and their articulation in judicial
doctrine and the debates of the Reconstruction Congress, do not bury
the principle of duality beneath an overriding principle of federal
supremacy. But they refute the separate function approach as a means
to explicate the duality principle, for they demonstrate that in fact the
176. Id. at 815-16.
177. Id. at 816.
178. The earliest removal procedure required a motion filed in state court. If the state
court denied the motion, defendant could litigate his case on the merits, reserving the propriety
of the denial for state court review, or he could file a motion in federal court and ignore the
state proceedings, risking loss of the suit if the federal court also denied his claim. Finally, he
could press his case in both courts at once. Since 1948, removal has been automatic, under 28
U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964), which allows defendant to file in federal court and notify plaintiff,
which notice effects the removal. See HART & VECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1033-35.
179. State v. Dunlap, 65 N.C. 491, 494-95 (1871).
180. Gaines v. State, 39 Tex. 606, 612 (1873).
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functions of state and federal judiciaries are not separate at all, but
unavoidably intertwined. Duality emerges as a residual principle,
standing only in default of special efforts by Congress and the federal
courts to accord special protection to federal rights.
C. Ghosts of the Supremacy Principle
Hamilton's belief that for lack of a federal forum federal rights
would go unvindicated has reappeared as a silent premise in the
background of many Supreme Court opinions. The institution of
federal judicial review of state decisions does not itself imply such a
premise: Marshall's famous aphorism that it is a Constitution which
the Court expounds18 could mean only that changing conditions
require corresponding changes in specific protections so as to keep the
whole scheme of the Constitution intact.1 12 It follows that the Court
must review state decisions if only to assure that state courts
understand and apply evolving constitutional principles. But in quiet
ways the premise appears in the Court's opinions-a recognition of
what may fairly be called the institutional orientation of state courts.
Thus the Court, while bending to the view that state courts will
protect federal rights as they must,113 has also bent the other way. In
Rachel and Dombrowski, for example, the Court recognized that a
state court faced with the mandate of a statute from its own legislature
will more likely uphold the statute than strike it down for repugnance
with the Constitution. This is the crux of the logic by which the Court
can conclude that the existence of a facially unconstitutional law
provides advance certainty that prosecution under it in a state court
will in that court deny a defendant's constitutional rights. 84 A similar
philosophy underlies the Court's willingness to engage in the finding
of "constitutional fact."'' A state court acknowledging the
constitutional principle that Negroes cannot by law be excluded from
juries will not avoid Supreme Court reversal merely by taking
181. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 406 (1819).
182. So Justice Black has interpreted the job of the Court. See Reich, The Living
Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYmPOsUm
133, 13942 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
183. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511,
518 (1955).
184. In Rachel, Justice Stewart remarked for the majority: "Removal is warranted only if
it can be predicted by reference to a law of general application that the defendant will be denied
or cannot enforce the specified federal rights in the state courts. A state statute authorizing the
denial affords an ample basis for such a prediction." 384 U.S. at 800.
185. See Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 46 N.C.L. REV. 223, 244-
49 (1968).
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arguably ambivalent testimony which it later characterizes as proof
of coincidental rather than law-imposed jury segregation.18 Nor will
the Court allow a state conviction to stAnd when there is in the record
"no evidence" to support it.18 7 These cases cannot be dismissed as
unique expressions of judicial skepticism in the only area of domestic
dispute which divided the country ii a Civil War. In the area of
criminal law a state court which finds as a matter of fact that a
confession was voluntary will not avoid federal reversal, for the
Supreme Court may freely characterize the facts otherwise, and
conclude that the confession was inadmissible because coerced.' 8
Similarly in first amendment cases the Court "will review the finding
of facts by a State court where a Federal right has been denied as the
result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to
support it ....*"" The premise that the institutional orientation of
state courts affects their treatment of federal rights is the only
reasonable explanation for the Supreme Court's skepticism.
III
A SUGGESTED REFORM
A. A Statutory Proposal
The fault of section 1443 as definitively construed by the
Supreme Court first in Strauder and finally in Rachel and Peacock is
not that Congress overreached itself,' but that Congress was inept.
The Court rejected the "unseemly" role in which a broader reading of
the removal provision would have cast the federal judiciary.", In
effect, Congress directed the federal courts to determine when and
where state tribunals would refuse to protect the equality of federal
rights. In effect the Court in Rachel and Peacock answered Congress
by declining to select from the delineated category those cases in
which state tribunals will predictably fail in their constitutional task,
except where the existence of facially void state statutes makes
predictability easier while affording federal courts the opportunity to
186. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
187. See note 146 supra.
188. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1949).
189. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927).
190. The Court had "no doubt .. .that Congress has constitutional power to provide
that all federal issues be tried in the federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the States,
or that jurisdiction of such issues be shared." Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966).
The Court there dealt "not with questions of congressional power, but with issues of statutory
construction." Id. at 814.
191. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 803 (1966).
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render decisions without extensive evidentiary findings, and where
states threaten to use facially valid statutes to deprive citizens of equal
access to public accommodations.
Rathel and Peacock teach lessons not in constitutional law or in
federalism, but in statutory draftsmanship: Since the sensitivity of the
Court does not permit it to predict when and where state courts will
vitiate federal rights, Congress must expressly do so by statute, or
suffer those rights to become the frequent victim of "repression by
mesne process.'1 2 In other words, a statute which would break
through the present limits of injunction and removal must simply
specify the nature of the claims which will support such initial federal
relief, and cannot depend for its operation upon the existence of a
provable certainty in advance of federal fact finding by which federal
courts can predict the future fairness of state adjudication. Such a
statute must shift the focus of federal inquiry from the fairness of
state courts to the scope and the merit of the claim presented. Such a
statute necessarily gives the litigant the power to abuse the remedy by
halting, at least momentarily, state court proceedings. It must
therefore attempt to minimize the disruptive effect upon state court
proceedings by discouraging litigants from using it to bring frivolous
claims, or claims of defense in cases peculiarly within the competence
of state courts. The statute proposed below represents an effort to
incorporate these requisites:
§ 000. Federal Injunction and Removal in State Criminal
Proceedings, Prospective and Pending.
(a) Injunction. Any person detained in custody by any State or
officers thereof may at any time prior to the filing of an information
or complaint, or the return of an indictment against him, obtain in
the district court of the United States in the district and division
embracing the place wherein he has been so detained, a temporary
restraining order staying the commencement of proceedings against
him upon bringing in said district court any claim specified in
subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Removal. A party defendant in any criminal proceeding
commenced in a State court may within ten days after the filing of an
information or complaint, or the return 9f an indictment against him,
remove the proceeding to the district court of the United States in the
district and division embracing the place where the action is pending
upon bringing in said district court any claim specified in subsection
(c) of this section.
(c) Claims. The claims to which subsections (a) and (b) of this
section refer are as follow:
192. Professor Amsterdam's phrase. Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 910.
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(1) A claim that the conduct for which he has been detained,
or upon which the information or complaint has been filed or the
indictment returned against him, constitutes political expression fully
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution
of the United States; or
(2) A claim that any punishment imposed upon him for the
conduct for which he has been detained, or upon which the
information or complaint has been filed or the indictment returned
against him, would deny him a right secured by Sections 1971, 1981,
1982, or 2000a of Title 42 of the United States Code;19 3 or
(3) A claim that the State statute or city ordinance for the
violation of which he has been detained, or for the violation of which
the information or complaint has been filed or the indictment returned
against him, is on its face vague, overbroad, or racially discriminatory
so as to render it unconstitutional under the equal protection or due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of
the United States; or
(4) A claim that a State statute or city ordinance prohibiting
loitering, breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, criminal
trespass, or similar public disturbance, for the violation of which he
has been detained, or for the violation of which the information or
complaint has been filed or the indictment returned against him, is as
applied to him unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
(d) Disposition of the case. If at any time the district court shall
find that claims made pursuant to subsection (c) of this section are
without merit, it shall dissolve the temporary restraining order
obtained pursuant to subsection (a) of this section or remand the
proceeding removed pursuant to (b) of this section. If the district
193. Section 1971 provides in pertinent part:
All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any
election by the people in any State . . . shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such
elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . ...
Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.
Section 2000a provides in pertinent part:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment . . . of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.
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court shall find in addition that the claim for relief made pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section is frivolous, then upon remand the State
court may proceed without awaiting the expiration of the time for
appeal from the disposition made by the district court."' If the
district court shall find that the claimant has under subsection (c)
stated a full defense, it may issue a permanent injunction staying the
commencement or continuance in State court of the proceedings
against the claimant, or dismiss the charges against him.
B. Commentary
The proposed statute differs from current law in three principal
respects. First, the proposal treats the federal remedies of anti-suit
injunction and removal in the-context of state criminal proceedings
which threaten racial equality and political expression as identical
means to secure relief, differing not as to the substantive rights each
seeks to protect but only as to the time in which each remedy
interrupts the process of state criminal adjudication. 9 5 At present, anti-
suit injunctions to block the commencement of state proceedings are
not available to protect racial equality,'96 and federal removal is not
available to protect political expression.19 Under the proposal each
remedy is available to protect both arrays of rights, and the selection
194. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964) the time for appeal is 60 days. One federal district
court in Louisiana, tersely dismissing a removal petition under the present section 1443, in which
a Negro defendant charged with misuse of property sought to remove on grounds of local
prejudice, remanded the case to the state court immediately. Noting that the claimant had a
right to appeal the remand order, the court held that where removal petitions are clearly
spurious, state proceedings ought not to be delayed. Louisiana V. Tyson, 241 F. Supp. 142, 147
(E.D. La. 1965). It is intended that the proposal retain the approach adopted by the Tyson
court.
195. The American Law Institute, in its STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (rent. Dfaft No. 6, 1968) [hereinafter cited as TENT.
DRAFT No. 6], recommended a change in the anti-injunction statute (see supra note 47) to
permit federal anti-suit injunctions in civil rights cases. Id. at 42 (see also infra note 202).
Acknowledging that continuance of a pending state prosecution is potentially as burdensome as
commencement of a new one, the ALl nevertheless suggested no expansion of the removal
remedy. Id. at 113-14. It reasoned that to expand removal would require a more carefully
restricted formula than a similar expansion of injunctive relief requires, since removal proceeds
automatically, without findings by a federal judge. Id. at 114. Professor Currie suggested that
the "everyday process of removal" may be "less irritating" than injunctions, but favors
expansion of injunctive relief over removal on the ground that it is clear that injunctive relief
does not involve full federal adjudication of state criminal cases. Currie, supra note 28, at 333.
The proposal here advanced offers a "more restricted" formula than the ALl proposal (see
note 202 infra), and makes clear that the function of the remedy, whether cast as an injunction
or removal, is to examine the merits of petitioner's claim and to remand to state court for
adjudication and sentencing whenever the claims are "without merit" or "frivolous." See
subsection (d) of the proposed statute.
196. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
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of remedy will reflect only the moment of time at which federal
intervention is sought. The sequential placement of the proposed
remedial provisions corresponds to the stages in the advancing state
process in which each remedy becomes appropriate. Thus, subsection
(a) proposes a temporary order restraining the commencement of state
judicial proceedings after the state has detained the claimant for the
purpose of prosecution-an order which under subsection (d) becomes
a permanent injunction if the district court finds the claim for relief to
be a complete defense. Subsection (b) similarly proposes removal of
the case after state proceedings have begun in order to block their
continuance-and this removal will result in a dismissal of the charges
against the claimant if the district court finds his claim for relief
substantial. Both remedies are automatic in the sense that they effect
a stay or initial removal without any federal adjudication." 8
Second, the suggested procedure differs from present practice in
that it both narrows and broadens present remedies. It narrows them
in a temporal sense, by providing the "strong medicine" of federal
intervention only within the first ten days after the state lodges formal
charges. Under current law, removal under section 1443 is possible in
criminal cases "at any time before trial"'99 and insofar as anti-suit
injunctions are available because federal statutes provide such relief as
"express exceptions" to the anti-injunction statute,2 there is no time
limit at all. Under the proposal the appeal time may still continue to
delay state court trial if the district court remands without finding
that the claim for federal relief was "frivolous. 2 ' Further, the time
lapse between filing in federal court and disposition after hearing may
continue to delay state adjudication. But such delays now occur
whenever claimants seek removal, and the ten-day limit of subsection
(b) will at least eliminate some of the uncertainties, for in the event
that 11 days elapse between formal charges and the trial date, state
officials will know whether federal relief will interfere with state trial.
Simultaneously the proposed statute broadens present remedies in a
substantive sense. It abandons the advance certainty criterion and the
equal access exception as checks to federal fact finding and focuses
198. The present 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) provides that upon filing the removal petition in
district court the defendant "shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file
a copy of the petition with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal ....
Similar service of the petition for temporary stay or removal upon the appropriate state court
and officers would effect the stay or removal under the proposed statute.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1964).
200. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
201. See note 194 supra.
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the attention of the federal court upon the subject of the dispute and
the merits of the opposing claims.112
Third, by providing an automatic removal or temporary stay of
state proceedings upon the "bringing of the claim" in federal court,
the proposal accords to the litigant the power to effect initial federal
interruption of state proceedings. This "automatic" element of the
suggested scheme is patterned after the existing removal procedure
which requires no federal adjudication or judge-made order to effect
removal at the outset, but only service of notice upon the state court
and the opposite party.0 3 The scheme relies upon the expens&° of
continued litigation and the power of the district court "at any time"
to remand the case as a check-against frivolous removal or injunction
claims.
Claims brought under subsections (c) (1) or (c) (4) would effect
initial federal intervention in a case such as Cameron, and defendants
would obtain at the outset a chance to argue both the facial validity
of the "rifle-shot""2 5 statute and the application of the statute to the
conduct for which they were apprehended. Claims brought under
subsection (c) (2) would effect removal or temporary stay in situations
such as those in Rachel and Peacock, and in similar cases which
today constitute the unfinished business of the Reconstruction
Congress. The proposed provisions do not permit temporary stay or
removal for claims under section 1983 on the ground that a mere
assertion of innocence to any criminal charge coupled with the claim
that detention for such innocent conduct violates the fourteenth
202. The ALl proposal allows anti-suit injunctions to restrain state criminal prosecutions
that should not be permitted to continue either because the statute or other law that is
the basis of the prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be applied to the party
seeking the injunction or because the prosecution is so plainly discriminatory as to
amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
TENT. DRAFT No. 6, supra note 195, at 42.
The proposal of this Comment, like the quoted segment of the ALl statute, focuses the
attention of the federal court upon the merits of constitutional claims, but without requiring a
finding that the conduct is "plainly" protected. Professor Currie, noting the importance of the
underlying facts in protecting constitutional claims, found the ALl proposal "too grudging" in
requiring that the prosecution be "plainly" forbidden. Currie, supra note 28, at 330. Noting
that discriminatory prosecution often aims at punishing activity which is not federally protected,
Currie favors a statute which would grant relief against bad-faith prosecutions without requiring
a finding that proceedings are "plainly discriminatory." Id. at 331-32. Subsection (c)(4) of the
proposal here advanced seeks to grant relief against such prosecution under state
"housekeeping" laws wherever the claimant can prove his innocence, so that regardless whether
his conduct is federally protected, he may obtain federal relief. See text accompanying notes 215-
17 infra.
203. See note 198 supra.
204. See Note, Civil Rights Removal, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1169 (1967).
205. Justice Fortas' phrase. 390 U.S. at 627.
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amendment's guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due
process should not suffice for initial federal intervention, and federal
courts should not at the outset adjudicate the merits of all such
claims."'8 Dombrowski's limitation upon the use of that section"' would
not operate if it had been included in subsection (c)(2), for the
proposal defines the instances in which initial federal relief is
appropriate not in terms of future denials of rights for which
Dombrowski and its progeny developed the advance certainty test, but
only in terms of the subject matter of the claim itself. That is, the
phrasing of the proposal does not require that a federal court find
that mere arrest and prosecution violate a right, as Dombrowski
found in the specific case of prosecution under a facially void statute.
Rather, it asks the federal court to find that punishment for the
conduct would violate a right-and this requires the court to find the
facts underlying the prosecution and the conduct itself.
Relief in the precise situation of Dombrowski would continue to
be available under the proposed scheme, which does not speak to the
exact factual context of Dombrowski at all. Dombrowski's injunction
issued under the threat of state prosecution, but there had been neither
detention nor the filing of a complaint."'5 The proposed scheme would
authorize federal intervention in later stages of a Dombrowski fact
situation, and any time a Dombrowski-like party sustantiated a claim
of protected political expression, whether the state's threat to that
claim were grounded in a facially void statute or in a valid statute
unconstitutionally applied to suppress political expression which the
first amendment protects. While the operation of the proposal turns
upon detention or the lodging of formal charges as the salient facts
proving the imminence of state action, it is the intent of the proposal
that the word "detained" be given broad meaning. It should include
release on bail or own recognizance, just as the phrase "in custody"
in the context of federal habeas corpus2 0 includes parole,210 on the
ground that any form of restraint of movement constitutes detention,
and bail or other conditional release usually imposes such restraint.21'
206. The breadth of claims which would sustain federal intervention would be virtually
unlimited, especially in view of Congress' now-complete power to expand fourteenth amendment
protections. See note 133 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
208. Claimants in Dombrowski only urged that the state was threatening to make arrests
and bring baseless charges. 380 U.S. at 482.
209. The remedy of federal habeas corpus is available only "in behalf of a person in
custody" pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1964).
210. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
211. In California, a defendant who leaves the state while free on bail becomes subject to
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Subsections (c)(l) and (c)(3) both relate to first amendment
claims, but the two sections differ in coverage. Statutes facially void
for vagueness or overbreadth may regulate expression in a nonpolitical
context, 212 or prohibit activity in no way related to expression.2 13
Under Dombrowski, relief from prosecution under such void statutes
is available only where they abridge first amendment freedoms and
only prior to the commencement of state proceedings 14 Under the
terms of subsection (c)(3) such relief would be available where any
facially void statute has become the basis for prosecution and
detention, and at any time within ten days after the filing of formal
charges. Where the statute is facially valid, however, a claimant
asserting his right of free expression can obtain relief only where he
proves that his conduct constituted political expression protected by
the first amendment.
Subsection (c)(4) is most problematic. Its purpose is to provide
federal relief to prevent any truly malicious prosecution under those
state "housekeeping" laws most susceptible to abuse 1 To prove that
the law is as applied to him vague or overbroad, a claimant need only
demonstrate his innocence. If he proves it, then the law as applied to
him is vague" While any person detained under such statutes could
thus assert his innocence in federal court, massive dislocation of state
criminal administration is hardly likely. The expense and trouble of
invoking the federal remedy will deter drunks and vagrants picked up
for overnight custody, and the prospect of remand for full
adjudication in state court will deter potential claimants against
whom police have acted with clear justification. It is likely that only
arrest upon order of the court before which he is to appear. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1310 (West
1966).
212. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court struck down a
state statute prohibiting exhibition of "obscene, indecent, immoral, or sacreligious" films,
apparently on a vagueness analysis. 345 U.S. at 504-05.
213. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), the Court struck down for
vagueness a statute prohibiting gangsterism, which the statute defined as belonging to a gang,
having a criminal record, or having been thrice convicted of disorderly conduct. 306 U.S. at
453.
214. 380 U.S. at 484 n.2, 489-90.
215. See text accompanying notes 146-56 supra.
216. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), in which Negro defendants
seeking service at a lunch counter were convicted on a criminal trespass charge under a statute
which forbade entry upon the premises of another after notice forbidding such entry. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendants had not entered in
violation of the owner's command, but had only refused to leave in violation of his command.
Since nobody had originally objected to entry, and the statute narrowly forbade only such entry,
it was unconstitutionally vague as applied to punish a refusal to leave the premises. Id. at 352-
53.
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those who are actually abused, for racial or political reasons unlikely
to receive neutral treatment at a state trial, will seek the federal
remedy.217
In summary, the proposed scheme would systematize federal anti-
suit injunction and removal as they apply to state criminal proceedings,
treating them as equivalent remedies. It would make both remedies
available, in succession, to protect rights of racial equality and
political expression whenever state criminal prosecutions, under valid
or void statutes, threaten those rights. The proposed scheme does not
ask federal courts to judge state judiciaries, but rather to inquire what
right is threatened, and whether the threat is actual. Any litigant may
"automatically" delay state court proceedings under the proposed
scheme, but any litigant may do so today under section 1446.18 To
some extent this potential vice inheres in the removal procedure."'
While the advance certainty barrier minimizes procedural abuse under
existing law, the threat of remand and plenary trial in state court will
minimize the possibility for similar abuse in the proposed scheme.
CONCLUSION
The arrays of federal rights which anti-suit injunctions protect
from the abuse of state criminal prosecutions differ according to the
time a claimant seeks relief. If he knocks at the door of the federal
forum before state proceedings commence, he may protect himself
from prosecution under facially void state laws abridging first
217. The relief available under subsection (c)(4) is potentially broader than that possible
under the ALl proposal which requires a finding of "plain" discrimination violative of the equal
protection clause. See note 202 supra. Professor Currie would go further than the ALl, allowing
federal injunctive relief where the prosecution is either "discriminatory" or in bad faith, but he
does not want federal courts to "proceed to try the facts and determine whether an offense had
in fact been committed." Currie, supra note 28, at 332. The author of the proposal here
presented would be amenable to amending subsection (c)(4) to allow relief from bad-faith or
discriminatory prosecutions under state housekeeping laws, but the theory of the statute as
drafted is that any distinction between a finding that prosecution is in bad faith (because "base-
less") and one that the law cannot be read to condemn the petitioner's conduct (hence that he is
innocent under the law involved), is vacuous.
Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1968), found the prosecution to lack probable
cause. It was, in short, "baseless." See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra. Since Cameron
has clouded the meaning of bad faith considerably, and since the burden of proof for innocence
under the state statute appears to be no greater than the burden of proof for bad faith, the
proposal here prefers the phrase "'unconstitutionally vague as applied." This phrase recognizes
that the facts underlying petitioner's claim are all-important, and that the real purpose of the
remedy is to free claimants from the burden of prosecution where they have not violated the
state law involved.
218. See note 198 supra.
219. See Amsterdam, supra note 80, at 832.
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amendment freedoms, and perhaps from bad-faith prosecutions, but if
he reaches federal court any time thereafter, he may only be able to
claim that the state is infringing his right to equal access to a public
accommodation. If he seeks removal, he may obtain it only where he
can point to a facially discriminatory state statute or, again, to a
denial of equal access.
Identical in effect, and in their proof requirements, anti-suit
injunctions and removal should also protect identical rights. No
constitutional consideration impedes clarification and uniformity of
such federal relief, and harmony between state and federal judiciaries
requires that the availability of such relief turn no longer upon
predictability of local fairness, but upon the nature of the rights
involved. Any proposal seeking to provide initial federal protection for
rights of racial equality and political expression will give litigants a
certain leeway for procedural abuse, and some leeway exists under
present law. But the proposal here advanced, which benefits litigants
with frivolous claims not at all, runs little greater risk of abuse than
now exists, while providing remedies in the cases which need them
most.
Christopher B. Mueller
1969]
